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A Wild Goose Chase: California’s Attempt to 
Regulate Morality by Banning the Sale of 
One Food Product 
MAX SHAPIRO* 
In 2004, California passed S.B. 1520, making it illegal to produce 
or sell foie gras as of July 1, 2012.1 In doing so, the California 
legislature joined a growing number of governments around the globe 
who have taken to banning the delicacy.2 This ban will have an 
immediate effect on national production of foie gras, but, more 
importantly, it will have devastating implications for food production 
worldwide.  
This Note will articulate the legal implications of the ban both 
domestically and abroad. Section I will objectively frame the ongoing 
debate about the merits of foie gras farming. Section II will analyze the 
California ban and discuss how it fits within the American legal system. 
Section III will predict what would happen if a country that produced 
and exported foie gras was to challenge California’s ban through the 
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) judicial remedies. Section IV 
will discuss the potential worldwide ramifications if the WTO were to 
either uphold or strike down California’s ban. Finally, Section V will 
discuss what has happened in the short time since the ban has gone into 
effect.  
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2006. The author would like 
to thank his family, especially his parents, Julie and Robert Shapiro, and his grandparents, Arthur 
Laub, Helene Laub and Ruth Shapiro, for their neverending help and continual support and 
guidance; his friends for putting up with his curmudgeonly ways during the formulation of this 
note; and the various professionals in and around the restaurant industry who helped him explore 
and learn about this and other food- and beverage-related topics. 
  1. S.B. 1520, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).  
 2. Laws & Policies, NOFOIGRAS.ORG, http://www.nofoiegras.org/legal.html (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2013). 
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I.  AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF FOIE GRAS PRODUCTION  
AND ITS EFFECT ON DUCKS AND GEESE 
The morality of foie gras production is an extremely polarizing 
issue, with passionate advocates on both sides.3 Those who oppose foie 
gras say that the specific process to make foie gras is cruel and amounts 
to torture.4 Those in favor of continuing foie gras production say that the 
process takes advantage of naturally occurring characteristics in ducks 
and geese to make a product that has no serious moral implications and 
tastes delicious.5  
On the worldwide scale of animal farming, the foie gras industry is 
relatively small. For example, in 1996, fifteen thousand tons of foie gras 
was produced in the world,6 compared to 58.3 million tons of chicken in 
the same year.7 The vast majority of the world’s foie gras is both 
produced and consumed in France.8 In 2003 for example, Americans 
consumed 420 tons of foie gras, compared to 17,500 tons in France.9 
Within the United States, there are four foie gras producers; two in 
upstate New York, one in Minnesota, and one in California.10  
Foie gras is French for “fat liver.”11 Producers engorge the livers of 
the ducks and geese by force-feeding them in the weeks leading up to 
their slaughter. This process has been in use for over four thousand 
years.12 Historically, geese were used for foie gras production.13 The 
Moulard duck, however, which is a cross between a female Pekin duck 
and a male Muscovy,14 is currently the most commonly used bird 
 
 3. See Patrick Battuello, Foie Gras: Misery Served, EXAMINER.COM, 
http://www.examiner.com/animal-rights-in-albany/the-foie-gras-war (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 4. NOFOIEGRAS.ORG, http://www.nofoiegras.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 5. Daniel David Guémené & G. Guy, The Past, Present and Future of Force-Feeding and 
“Foie Gras” Production, 60 WORLD POULTRY SCI. J. 210, 220-22 (2004).  
 6. Scientific Comm. on Animal Health and Animal Welfare, Welfare Aspects of the 
Production of Foie Gras in Ducks and Geese, 50 (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Foie Gras Report]. 
 7. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT FOOD OUTLOOK – JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997 (1997), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w4136e/w4136e08.htm. 
 8. Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 215 (stating that 74% of worldwide production took 
place in France by 1995, which rose to 83% of worldwide production as of 2002). 
 9. THOMAS J. SHEPSTONE, SHEPSTONE MGMT. CO., THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE FOIE GRAS INDUSTRY 5 (2004). 
 10. Joshua I. Grant, Hell to the Sound of Trumpets: Why Chicago’s Ban on Foie Gras Was 
Constitutional and What It Means for the Future of Animal Welfare Laws, 2 STANFORD J. 
ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 52, 59 (2009).  
 11. Id. at 54.   
 12. See Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 211. 
 13. Id. at 210. 
 14. See Hudson Valley Foie Gras & Duck Products, 
http://www.hudsonvalleyfoiegras.com/index.php/about-hvfg (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).  
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because it “has a stronger body and esophagus [and] is more resistant to 
disease.”15  
The birds’ livers are enlarged through a process called gavage, 
which farmers begin ten to fourteen weeks after the ducks are born.16 
During gavage, a metal tube is inserted down the duck’s esophagus, and 
the duck is fed pellets of corn mash through a pneumatic dispenser.17 
The duck’s diet begins with 0.4 pounds of food in its first feeding, and 
gradually increases over time.18 Because the diet is more than the duck 
would normally consume, the chemical composition and size of the 
liver changes.19 The liver undergoes steatosis, which means that it 
retains increased levels of fat, and grows to become much larger.20 The 
average foie gras liver weighs 982 grams, while a normal duck liver 
weighs seventy-six grams.21 Then, the ducks are slaughtered, butchered, 
and sold part by part.22 Every part of the duck is usable. The liver is the 
most prized and expensive, but producers such as Hudson Valley Foie 
Gras in upstate New York sell the duck’s feathers, breast and leg meat, 
and rendered duck fat.23  
There is debate as to whether the ducks suffer as a result of the 
forced feeding. Some claim that force-fed ducks suffer pain from the 
process and become diseased as a result of their enlarged livers.24 Also, 
they argue that force-fed birds suffer because of their decreased 
mobility.25 Finally, opponents of foie gras production point to a higher 
mortality rate for ducks and geese that are force-fed than those that are 
not.26  
On the other hand, some studies suggest that the ducks’ natural 
physiology allows them to weather the force-feeding process, and that 
the steatosis in the ducks’ liver is fully reversible.27 Even while the liver 
 
 15. Grant, supra note 10, at 60. 
 16. See Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 214.  
 17. Id. at 213.  
 18. Grant, supra note 10, at 61.  
 19. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 39.  
 20. See id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Nick Ravo, A Cornucopia of Native Foie Gras, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/24/nyregion/cornucopia-native-foie-gras-partners-efforts-
produce-menu-delicacy-abundance.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.  
 23. Id.  
 24. See About Foie Gras, NOFOIEGRAS.ORG,  http://www.nofoiegras.org/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2013).  
 25. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 61.  
 26. Id. at 49 (“The mortality rate in force fed birds varies from 2% to 4% in the two week 
force feeding period compared with around 0.2% in comparable ducks.”).  
 27. Marshall Sella, Does a Duck Have a Soul?, N.Y. MAG. (Jun. 18, 2005), available at 
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is enlarged, it still functions normally.28 The birds show less aversion to 
their feeders than they do to an unknown person.29 The World Poultry 
Science Association’s 2004 study concluded that “physiological 
indicators of stress, nociceptive signs (signs of pain) and behavioral 
responses were hardly affected by the force-feeding procedure.”30 
Therefore, proponents argue that what ducks endure as a result of foie 
gras production is not particularly cruel.  
II.  CALIFORNIA’S LAW: S.B. 1520 AND ITS LEGAL STATUS  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
S.B. 1520 could encounter some legal challenges from domestic 
foie gras producers who want to keep selling foie gras in California. 
This section will analyze the substance and history of S.B. 1520 itself.  
Then, it will look at the legality of S.B. 1520 within the framework of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, since 
the law has potential international effects, this section will analyze how 
S.B. 1520 complies with the Foreign Commerce Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
After S.B. 1520 passed through the California legislature, 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law on September 
29, 2004.31 The law “prohibit[s] a person from force feeding a bird for 
the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size . . .”32 It 
also “prohibit[s] a product from being sold in the state if it is the result 
of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver 
beyond normal size.”33 Violating the law will result in a “$1000 per 
violation per day”34 fine. Even though the Governor signed S.B. 1520 in 
2004, the bill did not go into effect until July 1, 2012.35  
California State Senator John Burton introduced S.B. 1520 on 
February 19, 2004.36 In stating the bill’s purpose, the legislature pointed 
to a number of things: that the birds have difficulty walking and 
 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/food/features/12071 (stating that ducks have no gag reflex and their 
livers have a natural propensity to expand and retract). 
 28.  Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 48. 
 29. Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 218.  
 30. Id. at 220.  
 31. See Cal. S.B. 1520 at 473.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 474.  
 36. Hearing on S.B. 1520 Before the S. Comm. on Bus. and Professions, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. 1 (Cal. 2004), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1501-
1550/sb_1520_cfa_20040427_093828_sen_comm.html [hereinafter S.B. 1520 Hearing].  
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breathing; that many other countries ban the practice; that forced 
confinement causes behavioral problems for the birds; that “normal 
exploratory behavior” of the birds is thwarted; that the birds are under 
stress; and that the birds cannot “interact socially in a normal manner.”37 
Not only will this ban criminalize production in California, but it 
will have negative consequences for the rest of the United States’ foie 
gras industry as well. The foie gras industry in New York alone 
employs 488 people and generates $23.1 million in economic output.38 
An outright ban in California, the country’s most populous state, will 
surely have an impact on that production. California is also considered 
by many to be “the epicenter of the American food scene . . . [and] 
where eating trends are born . . .”39 Therefore, the California ban will 
most certainly produce effects that will be felt beyond the state’s 
borders.  
A.  Illinois Restaurant Association v. City of Chicago  
and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Less than seven months after S.B. 1520 was signed into law, the 
city of Chicago followed California’s lead and introduced an ordinance 
banning any “food dispensing establishment” from selling foie gras.40 
The law was passed on April 26, 2006,41 and went into effect ninety 
days later.42 
Not long after its passage, the Chicago ban was challenged by the 
Illinois Restaurant Association in federal court.43 They claimed that the 
ordinance violated the Illinois state constitution as well as the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.44 However, the case was 
dismissed for the plaintiffs’ failure to state a sufficient claim.45 
Given the similarity between the Chicago and California bans, the 
court’s analysis in addressing the Restaurant Association’s Commerce 
Clause claim is particularly useful for analyzing the constitutionality of 
 
 37. Id. ¶¶ 4–10.  See also Cal. S.B. 1520, ¶¶ 4–9. 
 38. SHEPSTONE, supra note 9, at 1. 
 39. Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American Food, 13 CHAP. 
L. REV. 357 (2010).  
 40. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-39-002 (2006), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchicago?f=templates
$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il (repealed 2008). 
 41. Grant, supra note 10, at 65. 
 42. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-39-003 (2006). 
 43. See generally Illinois Restaurant Assoc. v. Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 44. Id. at 893. 
 45. Id. 
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the California ban. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power 
“[to] regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states.”46 While it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
courts have long recognized that the Commerce Clause also creates an 
implied limitation on states’ ability to burden interstate commerce.47 
Generally, courts follow a two-step approach.48 First, if the law 
discriminates against interstate commerce so that it acts as a 
protectionist measure for in-state commerce, the law is per se invalid.49 
However, “if a law indirectly affects interstate commerce and regulates 
evenhandedly,” the court must “examine whether the State’s interest is 
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly 
exceeds the putative local benefits.”50 According to Pike v. Blue Church, 
Inc., once the legislation is found to have “a legitimate local purpose . . . 
then the question becomes one of degree.”51 Second, the inquiry looks at 
the “extent of the burden” on interstate commerce, the “nature of the 
local interest involved, and . . . whether it could be promoted as well 
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”52 
The district court decision in Illinois Restaurant Association v. 
Chicago determined that the Chicago ban was not protectionist by 
nature.53 However, it did not conduct the second part of the usual 
approach and apply Pike.54 In refusing to use the Pike standard, the 
court highlighted a split in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.55 
On one hand, Pike is an old standby, used “by generations of law 
students” analyzing fact patterns under the dormant Commerce Clause.56 
However, the Illinois Restaurant Association court followed a Seventh 
Circuit decision that found it unnecessary to use Pike for laws that “are 
facially neutral and ‘do not give local firms any competitive advantage 
over those located elsewhere.’”57 
Some advocates insist that the district court employed the correct 
 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 47. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 897. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 897–98 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).  
 50. Id. at 898 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). This is known 
as the Pike balancing test. 
 51. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 898. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. See also Grant, supra note 10, at 82. 
 56. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 901–02. 
 57. Id. (quoting Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 
1995)). 
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analysis.58 They argue that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is 
primarily concerned with striking down anti-competitive and 
protectionist laws.59 Furthermore, they claim that Pike is only used as a 
means to show protectionism, and should not be used when the law in 
question is not discriminatory.60 Under this framework, if the law is not 
discriminatory in any way, then the Pike balancing test should not be 
used, as was the case in Illinois Restaurant Association.  
The Supreme Court has not approved this strategy. The most 
recent case involving the dormant Commerce Clause, Department of 
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, reaffirms the use of the traditional 
approach.61 In that case, the court analyzed a Kentucky law that 
involved tax exemptions for interest on Kentucky state bonds, but not 
interest from other states’ bonds.62 In laying out the framework for the 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, Justice Souter said that if the law 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, it would be upheld, 
unless it violates Pike.63 He noted that “[state] laws frequently survive 
this Pike scrutiny . . . though not always.”64 
Unhappy with the district court’s ruling, the Illinois Restaurant 
Association appealed the verdict to the Seventh Circuit.65 However, 
before the case could be heard, it became moot, as the Chicago ban was 
repealed with a 37-6 vote by the same legislative body that had passed it 
48-1 just two years before.66 Among the reasons for repeal, Chicago’s 
mayor said that the ban was “the ‘silliest ordinance’ the city council 
ever passed” and that they should be focused on “‘real issues’ like drug 
dealing and children caught in gang crossfire.”67 
If the California ban were to be challenged in court under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, it is likely that a court would apply Pike, 
given the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In doing so, the court 
would balance the state interest advanced by the law with the burden on 
 
 58. Grant, supra note 10, at 82. 
 59. See id. at 82–83. 
 60. Id. at 83 (citing Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986)). 
 61. See Dep’t of Revenue of KY v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008).  
62. Id. at 328.  
 63. Id. at 338–39. 
 64. Id. at 339. 
 65. Grant, supra note 10, at 81. 
 66. Monica Davey, Ban Lifted, Foie Gras Is Back on the Menu in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/us/15liver.html?_r=1. 
 67. Dan Mihalopolous, Foie Gras Wars: How the Chicago Ban Got Passed, CHI. TRIB. 
(Mar. 16, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-16/news/0903150177_1_foie-gras-
aldermen-mayor-richard-daley. 
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interstate commerce. California’s interest in passing the ban was to 
protect animal welfare and prevent unnecessary cruelty.68 The ban will 
burden interstate commerce in that foie gras will no longer be made in 
California, which will decrease overall supply. Furthermore, California 
will no longer import foie gras from other states or countries, which will 
have negative impacts on the foie gras producers in New York and 
Minnesota. Because the Pike test is generally deferential to state 
legislatures,69 and the state benefit is not clearly outweighed by the 
burden on interstate commerce, the ban would likely pass the Pike test 
and be upheld by the courts.   
B.  Foreign Impact: Legality Under the Foreign Commerce Clause 
The dormant Commerce Clause is not the only constitutional 
hurdle that the California ban would have to overcome. There are two 
clauses in the Constitution that the ban might also violate. First, as 
stated earlier, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the exclusive 
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”70 Next, the 
Supremacy Clause states that “all Treaties made . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land”.71 The California ban could violate one or 
both of these provisions.  
The rarely invoked Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress 
greater power over foreign commerce than it has over domestic 
interstate commerce.72 This is to establish national uniformity when it 
comes to foreign trade.73 As a result, “[the] Supreme Court imposes 
tighter restrictions on state legislation under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause than under the dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause.”74 The landmark Foreign Commerce Clause case, Japan Line 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, struck down a state tax on Japanese 
shipping vessels as an infringement on Congress’s power to regulate 
foreign commerce.75 In its opinion, the Court described a need for the 
federal government to “speak with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments.”76 This case found new 
“negative implications of Congress’ power” under the Foreign 
 
 68. See generally S.B. 1520 Hearing, supra note 36. 
 69. See Davis, 553 U.S. at 1808. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 72. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 960 (2010).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 966. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of LA, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). 
 75. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. 
 76. Id. at 449. 
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Commerce Clause.77 In other words, since regulating foreign trade is 
wholly within the ambit of the Federal government’s power, the Foreign 
Commerce Clause acts as a barrier to forbid states from legislating in 
this area. 
Since Japan Line, there have only been a handful of Supreme 
Court cases that have dealt with the Foreign Commerce Clause, but they 
have chipped away at its scope. In Container Corp. of America v. 
Franchise Tax Board, the court distinguished “between state regulations 
that merely have ‘foreign resonances’ and those that ‘implicat[e] foreign 
affairs,’”78 and only applied the Foreign Commerce Clause to the 
latter.79 Furthermore, the Court limited the clause's applicability by 
narrowly defining a measure that “implicates foreign affairs”.80 
Recently, the Court has been more likely to use “positive 
preemption through congressional action [rather than] the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause” to strike down state laws that interfere with 
foreign commerce.81 It is unclear what constitutes governmental action 
sufficient to preempt a state law.82 On one hand, “the preemptive force 
of [an] executive agreement” is enough to overrule a conflicting state 
law,83 but on the other, a state law will be upheld where there is “no 
‘specific indications of congressional intent’ to bar the state action 
challenged.”84 
Here, there is no federal governmental action that directly conflicts 
with the California ban. Congress has been silent on the foie gras issue. 
The Animal Welfare Act, which Congress passed in 1966, excludes 
animals that are used for farming.85 The act specifically allows states to 
“retain the responsibility of protecting farm animals.”86 Thus, there is no 
indication that Congress intended to bar any state from passing a foie 
gras ban. 
 
 77. Id. 
 78.  Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After 
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 757 (2007) (quoting Container Corp. of 
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)). 
 79. Id. at 758. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 762 (citing Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)). 
 82. Id. at 763.  
 83. Id. at 765 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)). 
 84. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 324 (1994). 
 85. 7 U.S.C. 54 § 2132(g). 
 86. Lesley Peterson, Talkin’ ‘Bout a Humane Revolution, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 265, 267 
(2010). 
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C.  Potential Preemption: Legality Under the Supremacy Clause 
The Supremacy Clause could also operate to make the California 
ban illegal. According to the Supremacy Clause, any law that conflicts 
with a treaty made under the authority of the United States is preempted 
by that treaty.87 On January 1, 1995, the United States acceded to be a 
part of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),88 the international 
organization created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).89 Since the United States is a party to that treaty, it follows 
that any conflicting state law would be presumptively invalid. 
Article XI of GATT states that “[no] prohibitions or restrictions . . 
. shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party”.90 If the ban violates Article XI, then it would place the United 
States in breach of a treaty, and thus be preempted.  
However, this ban on the foie gras trade would still be legal if it 
falls under one of GATT’s exceptions under Article XX, as discussed 
below.91 Ultimately, if the ban does not meet the requirements of Article 
XX, then it violates GATT, and would be illegal under the Supremacy 
Clause. However, if it falls under Article XX’s reach, then it does not 
violate GATT or, by extension, the Supremacy Clause.  
III.  HOW THE WTO WOULD ADJUDICATE A COMPLAINT BASED  
ON CALIFORNIA’S BAN 
S.B. 1520 could have a negative effect on international trade. This 
section will analyze what could happen if another foie gras producing 
country challenged the United States under the WTO rules based on the 
California ban being a violation of GATT. First, it will briefly outline 
the historical background of both the WTO and GATT. Next, there will 
be a discussion of the parts of GATT that are relevant to international 
free trade – those that another country would use to challenge S.B. 
1520. Finally, this section will take a comprehensive look at Article 
XX, which lays out the general exceptions that are allowed in GATT. It 
will analyze whether S.B. 1520 could be considered a law that is 
 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 88. Trade Profiles, United States, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 2011), 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US. 
 89. Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [hereinafter Understanding 
the WTO: Who We Are]. 
 90. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
art. XI, § 1 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 91. See id. art. XX. 
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necessary to benefit public morals or animal welfare.  
GATT is a multilateral treaty that has been in effect since 1948.92 
Originally, GATT provided an international system of rules that 
governed trade between countries.93 In order to further encourage and 
facilitate free trade, GATT has been modified through rounds of 
negotiations every few years since its inception.94 The most recent 
round, which took place in Uruguay, resulted in the most significant 
changes to date; it created a comprehensive international trade dispute 
settlement body: the WTO.95 
The goal of the WTO is to encourage and stimulate trade between 
countries by creating a comprehensive multilateral trading system.96 It 
does this by setting up a framework that follows a number of principles 
designed to promote more robust trade: trade without discriminating 
between countries; gradually bringing about free trade; creating 
predictability between trading partners within the system; promotion of 
fair competition; and the encouragement of development and economic 
reform.97 
Besides being an entity that codifies international trade rules, 
members also rely on the WTO to settle trade disputes and negotiate 
trade agreements with each other.98 In a nutshell, the WTO is an 
organization “where member governments go, to try to sort out the trade 
problems they face with each other.”99  
As “the central pillar of the multilateral trading system,” the WTO 
provides its members with a comprehensive system for dispute 
resolution.100 The disputes are settled in stages overseen by the Dispute 
Settlement Body, which applies and interprets WTO law.101  
Before any formal judicial action occurs, the disputing countries 
are encouraged to discuss the issue to see if they can resolve it 
themselves or with the help of mediation by the WTO director-
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general.102 If that fails, the case goes to a panel, where each party 
presents their case.103 Afterwards, the panel makes final rulings or 
recommendations.104 Finally, if a party is unhappy with the ruling of the 
panel, it can make an appeal to the WTO Appellate Body, which can 
uphold, modify, or reverse the panel.105  
Any member of GATT can bring a case against a second member 
when they think the second member has violated the treaty.106 In 
response to the California foie gras ban, the United States could find 
itself being challenged by France, Canada, or any other country that 
exports foie gras into the United States. Even though California is not 
an independent party to GATT, it is a territorial unit of the United 
States, so its legislative actions create liability for the United States as a 
whole.107 
A.  Article XI Analysis 
A complaint lodged against the United States would argue that the 
California ban violates Article XI of GATT. Article XI, as stated above, 
“prohibits countries from imposing quantitative restrictions on 
imports.”108 A trade restriction or tariff will generally not violate GATT 
unless it is seen as a protection for that country’s “like” product.109 
However, a ban on a particular good violates article XI regardless of 
whether or not that good is “produced domestically or imported from 
any country besides the one in question.”110  
A leading WTO case on trade restrictions is United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (“Tuna-Dolphin I”). At issue was a 
U.S. ban on tuna caught by Mexican fishing vessels equipped with nets 
that were hazardous to dolphins.111 In that case, the WTO panel found 
that the restriction violated article XI of GATT, because GATT forbids 
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quantitative restrictions on imports.112 The United States did not ban all 
tuna, nor did it ban all fish from Mexico; it only banned those tuna that 
had been caught in a specific way.113 However, the panel still found that 
this was an impermissible barrier to free trade.114 
The California ban would meet a similar fate under WTO scrutiny. 
It bans all foie gras, regardless of where it comes from. This is a more 
restrictive trade constraint than the ban on Mexican tuna caught with 
non-dolphin safe nets. Therefore, a WTO panel would almost certainly 
find that California’s ban on foie gras violates GATT article XI. 
B.  Can California Find an Exception Under Article XX? 
A finding that a country’s trade restriction violates article XI does 
not end the inquiry into the legality of that restriction. If a country is 
found to violate a provision of GATT, they “may seek to defend it 
under the General Exceptions set out in Article XX.”115 Article XX 
partially reads: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public 
morals; [or] (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health . . .116 
The Article XX inquiry has two parts: it first attempts to find a 
particular exception that the restriction falls under; then it asks whether 
the restriction satisfies the introduction to the Article, the “chapeau.”117 
Another consideration to keep in mind is that the Appellate Body sees 
Article XI rights as fundamental substantive rights, but it does not 
afford Article XX rights the same level of deference.118 As a result, 
panels interpret Article XX exceptions “narrowly, in a manner that 
preserves the basic objectives and principles of the General 
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Agreement.”119 
1.  Article XX(a): The Public Morals Exception 
The first issue is whether the California ban is “necessary to 
protect public morals.”120 There is very little WTO jurisprudence on 
Article XX(a), also known as the public morals exception.121 However, 
faced with an Article XX(a) issue, a panel would use a similar analytical 
framework to that used with other Article XX exceptions.122 Thus, a 
WTO case analyzing Article XX(g), a GATT exception for conserving 
natural resources, would contain the framework a panel would likely 
use for Article XX(a).  
In United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, (hereinafter “U.S.-Gasoline”), the Appellate Body used a 
three-part test to determine if the disputed regulation fell within an 
Article XX(g) exception.123 They looked at: (1) whether the regulation 
was within the scope of the exception; (2) whether it was “necessary” to 
fulfill the policy goals of that exception; and (3) whether it was a 
violation of the chapeau’s ban on trade discrimination or 
protectionism.124 Therefore, using the framework from U.S.-Gasoline, a 
panel would likely use the following analysis for Article XX(a): (1) 
whether it regulates a "public moral", (2) whether it is “necessary” to 
protect that moral, and (3) whether it complies with the chapeau.125 
According to the panel in United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (hereinafter 
“U.S.-Gambling”),126 public morals “can vary in time and space, 
depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, 
ethical and religious values.”127 The U.S.-Gambling panel argued that 
countries should be given some flexibility to come up with their own 
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definitions of “public morals.”128 In this case, the panel defined “public 
morals” as a term that “denotes standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”129 Traditional 
subjects of moral regulation in the past have included the slave trade, 
drugs and alcohol, and obscene materials.130 In U.S.-Gambling, the goal 
of the legislation was “the prevention of underage gambling and the 
protection of pathological gamblers.”131 Ultimately, the panel decided 
that this goal “could fall within the scope” of the public morals 
exception.132 
It should be noted that the dispute in U.S.-Gambling fell under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), not GATT.133 
However, GATS Article XIV, which was at issue in U.S.-Gambling, 
and Article XX of GATT, are similar enough that a panel would use the 
same analytical framework.134 Furthermore, interpretations by previous 
GATT Appellate Bodies were valid under GATS as well.135 Therefore, 
logic would dictate that any GATT adjudication could look to GATS 
jurisprudence in a similar fashion. 
For the second prong of the analysis, a measure must be necessary 
to be valid. The Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef (hereinafter “Korea-Beef”)136 appellate body defined 
“necessary” as not only “that which is ‘indispensable’ or ‘of absolute 
necessity’ or ‘inevitable’” but it also includes “a range of degrees of 
necessity.”137 The standard requires balancing how much the law is 
tailored to meet the goals of the law, “the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law . . . and the accompanying 
impact of the law . . . on regulation on imports or exports.”138 In more 
concrete terms, necessity is based on how much the measure affects 
other nations (how outwardly directed the measure is), as well as 
whether the restricting country has attempted to implement less trade-
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restrictive alternatives.139  
The appellate body in Korea-Beef found that the Korean practice 
requiring imported beef to be kept distinct from domestic beef violated 
GATT.140 Korea’s goal in implementing this practice was to eliminate 
fraudulent sales of imported beef, but the Appellate Body did not view 
this practice as “necessary.”141 The panel and Appellate Body both 
found that Korea had not explored alternative means of achieving the 
desired ends.142 The Korean government could effectively minimize 
fraud by leveling fines or requiring beef sellers to keep records of their 
transactions, rather than requiring separate sales of imported beef.143  
Therefore, the measures in place were not “necessary” to prevent 
fraudulent practices.144  
In the case of S.B.1520, California would argue that foie gras 
production is a cruel practice, and banning it is necessary to protect 
public morals. If a panel were to analyze this claim under Article XX(a) 
according to past WTO jurisprudence, it may find that California has a 
valid argument.  
The panel would first have to determine whether the foie gras ban 
protects public morals. They would look to see if the public has a 
general interest in animal welfare and whether the production of foie 
gras implicates California’s standards of right or wrong.  
As to the first inquiry, a panel would find that animal welfare is 
something that has been regulated for decades.145 Therefore, the scope 
of Article XX(a) would presumably include animal welfare as a public 
moral.146 Furthermore, as shown in U.S.-Gasoline, panels are deferential 
to legislatures when determining whether a regulation implicates public 
morals.147  
On the other hand, a good argument can be made for excluding 
animal welfare from the scope of Article XX(a). A treaty must be 
interpreted first by looking at the ordinary meaning of its words and 
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second by the context of those words.148 Article XX(a)’s words are 
unrevealing; they could be interpreted as being either broad and 
deferential to legislative whim, or narrow and only to be used in 
extreme or obvious circumstances.149 Here, it is insightful to look at the 
context of Article XX(a), specifically in light of the other exceptions 
explored within this article. 
Article XX(b), to be discussed subsequently, allows trade 
restrictions in order to protect animal life or health.150 Issues involving 
animal welfare seem to fit easily into Article XX(b). Thus, “assuming 
that every section of Article XX is supposed to have its own 
independent meaning, one could argue that the scope of section (a) does 
not include measures which fall under section (b).”151 S.B. 1520 
illustrates this perfectly; according to the legislature, the motivation for 
passing S.B. 1520 was really to protect the health of the birds being 
raised for foie gras, not to protect the public.152  
Overall, because there has not been any GATT adjudication based 
on Article XX(a), there is no decisive precedent. There are persuasive 
arguments on both sides as to whether force-feeding ducks and geese 
would be found to implicate public morals. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether or not S.B. 1520 would fall within Article XX(a)’s exception.  
Whether a ban is necessary to safeguard those public morals is 
another difficult issue. First, it is important to note that the regulation is 
not directed outwardly; it does not ask foie gras producing countries to 
stop their practices, it just bars them from exporting to California. Next, 
it is unlikely that there are any less trade-restrictive alternatives. 
S.B.1520 specifically bans “force feeding a bird for the purpose of 
enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size;”153 it does not ban foie 
gras per se. Furthermore, at this point in time, foie gras cannot be 
produced without force-feeding. If a country wanted to prevent that 
specific form of animal cruelty, it could not allow any foie gras.154 Thus, 
proponents of S.B. 1520 would argue that the ban is narrowly tailored to 
the goal of protecting the public morality against the cruelty of foie gras 
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production.  
Foie gras producers, however, would argue that S.B. 1520 is 
underinclusive and arbitrary. A more in-depth discussion will follow in 
Part IV, but if the legislature is truly trying to protect the public from 
the evils of animal cruelty, foie gras is a poor choice to do it with. There 
are farming practices involving other animals that are equally, if not 
more, cruel to animals than foie gras farming. Also, foie gras production 
is inconsequential, compared to the chicken or beef trade, which are 
both rife with inhumane practices. Thus, foie gras production should be 
relatively low on the list of priorities for those whose goal is stopping 
inhumane farming practices.  
2.  Article XX(b): The Animal Welfare Exception 
Proponents of S.B. 1520 would also argue that the ban falls within 
Article XX(b)’s exception that allows WTO members to pass measures 
to protect animal life or health. Article XX(b) jurisprudence has been 
shaped by two cases involving dolphin-safe tuna fishing.155 In both 
cases, the United States sought to ban non-dolphin safe tuna under 
Article XX(b), which allows free trade exceptions to protect animal 
life.156 The Tuna-Dolphin II panel used a three-step approach to decide 
if the regulation fell within Article XX(b), just like the U.S.-Gasoline 
panel did for Article XX(a)—whether: (1) the policy is directed at 
protecting animal life or health; (2) the measure invoked to fulfill that 
policy is actually “necessary”; and (3) whether the measure is consistent 
with the chapeau of Article XX.157  
For the first step, the panel in Tuna-Dolphin I looked to the 
legislative history of Article XX(b) and decided that its focus was to 
enable countries to pass “sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of 
humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing 
country.”158 Even though protecting the lives of dolphins is within the 
general purview of Article XX(b), in that it seeks to protect animal life, 
the fact that the U.S. was trying to regulate outside of its own territory 
made the legality of its regulations unclear.159 Allowing a country to 
create a policy that has extraterritorial effects is dangerous and 
potentially destructive to the GATT system. Ultimately, the panel found 
that the United States did not have the ability to regulate activities 
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involving dolphins that were in Mexican waters.160  
Like the dolphin-protecting regulation in the Tuna-Dolphin cases, 
S.B. 1520 deals with animal health, in that it tries to protect ducks and 
geese from being force-fed. However, there is a critical difference in 
that the dolphin measure sought to protect wild animals, whereas S.B. 
1520 looks to protect farm animals that are raised for slaughter.161 This 
is an area that is traditionally outside the purview of animal cruelty 
laws.162 As an example, “the U.S. [sic] [has] federal laws purporting to 
protect the welfare of all animals, but these laws specifically exempt 
farmed animals from their protection.”163 Furthermore, most states in the 
United States have animal cruelty laws that exempt agricultural 
practices.164 There is a difference between regulating to protect the 
environment and regulating the farming industry. 
Additionally, Article XX(b) has been interpreted to protect animal 
life and health, but has never been extended to protect animal welfare.165 
In practice, this exception is used “to prevent the spread of diseases or 
to ensure the safety of food products for humans,166 not to protect animal 
rights.167 Thus, the intent of Article XX(b) was to protect human beings, 
not the animals who are raised to feed them. 
However, unlike the U.S. tuna fishing regulation, S.B. 1520 does 
not attempt to change how foie gras producers make their product. 
Since foie gras cannot be made without force-feeding, the bill bans all 
foie gras from California.168 In the Tuna cases, the U.S. policy attempted 
to pressure the Mexican fishermen into using more animal-friendly 
methods. This is different because the goal of the foie gras ban is not to 
change how foie gras is made, but simply to keep foie gras from 
entering into the state. Therefore, S.B. 1520 does not attempt to legislate 
extra-jurisdictionally. 
Article XX(b) also requires that the regulation be necessary. In 
order to determine the meaning of necessary, it is unclear whether a 
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panel would follow the Tuna-Dolphin cases, since they also deal with 
Article XX(b), or the Korea-Beef decision, which is more recent but 
resolves an issue involving Article XX(d).  
As discussed earlier, the Korea-Beef decision defines “necessary” 
in broad strokes, considering a wide range of circumstances as being 
“necessary.”169 The Tuna-Dolphin II panel, on the other hand, was 
influenced by the 1990 opinion in Thailand – Restrictions on 
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (hereinafter “Thailand-
Cigarettes”) in determining Article XX’s meaning of “necessary,” 
which said:  
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with 
another GATT provision as “necessary” in terms of Article XX(d) if 
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to 
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is 
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure 
consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a 
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably 
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency 
with other GATT provisions.170  
At first glance, this seems like a more restrictive definition of 
“necessary” than the one given in Korea-Beef. It does allow some 
wiggle room, however, by its liberal use of the term “reasonably.” Thus, 
even under the Thailand-Cigarettes standard, in order to show 
compliance, a GATT member would only need to show that it acted 
reasonably in adopting the measures that violate GATT.  
Because of the deference given to those who raise animals for 
food, however, the United States would probably not be able to justify 
the foie gras ban as “necessary” to protect animal life or health, as far as 
GATT is concerned. 
3.  Satisfying Article XX’s Chapeau 
The last step in the analysis under both Article XX(a) and XX(b) is 
to decide whether the measure violates the chapeau of Article XX.171  
The leading case on Article XX’s chapeau is the appellate body’s 
opinion in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
 
 169. Korea-Beef, supra note 135, at 161.  
 170. Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439-36S/345 
(Jan. 16, 1989).  
 171. See Thomas, supra note 109, at 623.  
  
2012] A Wild Goose Chase 47 
Shrimp Products (hereinafter “Shrimp-Turtle I”).172 
Article XX’s chapeau makes sure that “measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
[that they are] a disguised restriction on international trade.”173 In other 
words, the regulation will be struck down if “the purpose of the 
regulation in question is to confer a competitive advantage on the 
domestic industry, or to generally restrict trade, rather than to 
legitimately protect the morals of society . . .”174  
In analyzing the chapeau’s requirements, the Shrimp-Turtle I 
appellate body noted that the chapeau has to be followed in conjunction 
with a specific section of Article XX.175 Just because a measure’s policy 
goal is consistent with one of the Article XX exceptions does not mean 
that it will necessarily comply with the chapeau.176 A measure that does 
not comply with a specific Article XX exception cannot be justified 
even if it satisfies the chapeau.177 By the same token, a measure that 
does not satisfy the chapeau is invalid even if it falls within an 
exception.178 
In general, the chapeau “embodies the recognition on the part of 
WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights and 
obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of 
the exceptions . . . on one hand, and the substantive rights of the other 
Members . . . on the other hand.”179 Members can invoke the exceptions, 
but this should be done sparingly so as not to downgrade the 
effectiveness of the treaty system as a whole.180 Essentially, the 
exceptions should be limited, conditional, and, most importantly, only 
invoked in good faith.181  
Additionally, the trade-restricting nation cannot engage in 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”182 Unjustifiable 
discrimination occurs when a country treats WTO members differently 
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from each other, as was the case in Shrimp-Turtle I.183 The measure in 
the Shrimp-Turtle cases violated the chapeau because “exporting 
members [of shrimp to the United States] were faced with ‘a single, 
rigid and unbending requirement’ to adopt essentially the same policies 
and enforcement practices as those applied to, and enforced on, 
domestic shrimp trawlers in the United States.”184 
In this case, Article XX’s chapeau should not pose a significant 
problem for S.B. 1520, as long as it falls within an Article XX 
exception. For one thing, S.B. 1520 does not leave room for different 
treatment between countries. It unequivocally states that no food 
product that is the result of force-feeding will be allowed into 
California.185 It treats producers in foreign countries the same as 
producers in the United States. While this might stifle trade, it is 
certainly not a protectionist measure, disguised or otherwise, which is 
really what the chapeau tries to eliminate. The bill is not trying to confer 
a competitive advantage on any U.S. industry. Its goal is to eliminate 
force-feeding in the United States as well as abroad. Therefore, a panel 
would have no reason to invalidate S.B. 1520 on the grounds that it 
violates the chapeau of Article XX.  
IV.  A SLIPPERY SLOPE: WHY BANNING FOODS FOR MORAL PURPOSES 
COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO WORLD TRADE 
A.  It is Unlikely That S.B. 1520 Would Have its Day in WTO Court 
Figuring out whether or not S.B. 1520 would survive a complaint 
is a nice exercise in WTO theory, but the likelihood of a country such as 
France or Canada lodging a formal complaint against the United States 
is low because of the small size of the foie gras trade and the small 
impact that one state has on that trade.  
Of the total foie gras consumption in the United States, which is 
only $14.5 million, about eighty-seven percent comes from domestic 
foie gras production.186 Canadian foie gras makes up six percent of U.S. 
consumption, which is 25.2 tons or $870,000 worth.187 France accounts 
for seven percent of U.S. consumption, which equals about 29.4 tons of 
foie gras188 or $1.02 million worth.189 Since France produces about 
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seventeen thousand tons of foie gras each year,190 the United States only 
consumes 0.17 percent of total French foie gras produced. Thus, 
California’s total consumption of foie gras is even less than 0.17 
percent.   
It makes little sense for either country to put in the time, effort, and 
political capital to challenge S.B. 1520. Canada exports fifty-seven 
thousand tons of poultry191 and over 400 thousand tons of beef per 
year.192 The total meat and poultry industry accounted for $21.3 billion 
in 2009.193 That makes the total revenue that would have gone to 
California from Canadian foie gras producers at most 0.00004% of the 
Canadian meat and poultry industry. Similarly, France exports over a 
billion dollars’ worth of poultry per year.194 Total U.S. consumption of 
foie gras accounts for less than one tenth of a percent of that billion 
dollars. The reality is that neither country will likely feel the effects of 
S.B. 1520 enough to challenge it through the WTO. However, because 
of the reasoning behind S.B. 1520, and the general importance of the 
meat and poultry trade worldwide, the foie gras ban sets a dangerous 
precedent. 
B.  Arguments for Maintaining the GATT Scheme 
In a broader sense, it would be dangerous for a country to be able 
to impose its own morality on international trade, especially under the 
free trade scheme that GATT establishes. It is true that the difference 
between foie gras and chicken production is huge when considering the 
worldwide value of each. However, philosophically, they are similar; in 
both cases, animals are being raised so humans can eat them. Saying 
that one is cruel and the other is not is simply a matter of personal 
judgment. Some would say that raising any animal for food is immoral; 
others might argue that animals being raised for food have no 
protectable interest; and there are countless positions in between. If a 
foie gras ban were upheld, future WTO panels could uphold any ban 
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based on a nebulous insistence that it was enacted to protect public 
morals. 
The WTO panel in Shrimp-Turtle I made an impassioned defense 
of a strong version of the GATT multilateral trading system: 
We are of the view that a type of measure adopted by a Member 
which, on its own, may appear to have a relatively minor impact on 
the multilateral trading system, may nonetheless raise a serious threat 
to that system if similar measures are adopted by the same or other 
Members. Thus, by allowing such type of measures even though 
their individual impact may not appear to be such as to threaten the 
multilateral trading system, one would affect the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system.195 
The appellate body later overruled the panel on this issue and 
toned down the rhetoric, saying that the panel interpreted GATT’s 
purposes too broadly in striking down the restriction.196 The inquiry 
should not look at the purposes of GATT as a whole, the appellate body 
claimed; a restrictive trade measure falls within an Article XX 
exception as long as it does not attempt to abuse those exceptions.197  
In so ruling, the appellate body weakens GATT too much. The 
beauty of GATT is in its simplicity. It protects the free flow of goods 
between countries. Thus, its exceptions should be allowed narrowly in 
order to maintain that free flow. Strengthening the Article XX 
exceptions creates a dangerous precedent, whereby countries can easily 
stifle free trade and WTO panels will have to make moral judgment 
calls. This would lead to inconsistent judicial results, unevenness in the 
law, and uncertainty about what a country can and cannot do. 
C.  The Israeli Supreme Court’s Unique Take on Foie Gras 
Some would argue that S.B. 1520 is not the first step towards state-
imposed vegetarianism; that the production of foie gras is unique in its 
cruelty among the methods that are used to raise animals for food. In 
fact, the issue was brought before the Israeli Supreme Court in a 2003 
case that challenged foie gras production under Israeli animal cruelty 
laws.198 
The Israeli animal welfare statute says that “[a] person will not 
torture an animal, will not be cruel toward it, or abuse it in any way.”199 
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The case came before the Israeli Supreme Court when a number of 
animal-protection groups petitioned the court to force the Minister of 
Agriculture to prohibit foie gras production under that law.200 
Ultimately, the court had to decide whether foie gras production could 
comply with the animal welfare statute.201 
The court first acknowledged that there were two different points 
of view: one which views animals as property of the person that owns it, 
and the other, on the opposite side of the spectrum, which believes that 
animals, as living creatures, deserve the same protections as humans 
have.202 Ultimately, whether an act can be considered torture, cruelty or 
abuse, and therefore in violation of Israeli law, it had to be analyzed 
according to a three-part test, laid out in a previous Israeli case, Let the 
Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprises.203 The analysis 
looks at: (1) whether a reasonable person would find the act to be 
torture, cruel or abuse; (2) that the animal encounters pain or suffering; 
and (3) whether the pain or suffering is proportionate to the purpose for 
which the animal is undergoing it.204 
In the case of force-feeding, the Noah court found that the first 
element was satisfied, that a normal observer would surely find that the 
process constitutes torture.205 Justice Grunis of the Noah court figured 
that the normal human response to seeing an animal force fed in order to 
enlarge its liver would see the process as torture.206 The court also 
adopted the position of the EU’s Scientific Committee on Animal 
Health and Animal Welfare in their report on the production of foie 
gras, which found that force-feeding ducks and geese causes 
suffering.207 Lastly, the court had to determine whether “the ends justify 
the means” or whether having foie gras available justified the suffering 
of the ducks and geese.208  
Ultimately, in a 2-1 opinion, the Court decided to ban the practice 
of force-feeding.209 Justice Strasberg-Cohen wrote the opinion adopted 
by the majority, in which she drew a distinction between luxury and 
necessary food products.210 In her calculus, the need to produce a luxury 
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food item was not serious enough to balance the suffering that the ducks 
and geese went through in the force-feeding process.211 Therefore, the 
practice of force-feeding fell within the scope of the animal cruelty law 
and was declared illegal.212  
The United States also has a law dealing with animal welfare: the 
Animal Protection Act. However, it deals mostly with animals used in 
research facilities and those that are transported alive to be sold 
elsewhere.213 Furthermore, it specifically places responsibility on the 
Secretary of Agriculture to create standards that determine what 
constitutes cruelty.214 Thus, it is unlikely that a court would even take a 
case like the one in Israel, as it presents a separation of powers issue and 
because food production falls outside of its intended purpose.  
D.  Looking to the Future 
Lastly, even though the WTO does not protect agricultural animal 
welfare with Article XX, there are signs that they may adopt more 
animal-friendly measures in the future.215 Many international animal 
health standards are adopted from the OIE, the World Organization for 
Animal Health.216 “Beginning in 2001, the [OIE] agreed to begin a 
discussion on animal welfare issues with the goal of adoption of 
international standards.”217 While findings of the OIE would not become 
law immediately, it would have great influence on animal welfare laws 
worldwide.218  
V.  REACTIONS TO S.B. 1520 GOING INTO EFFECT 
The California foie gras ban went into effect July 1, 2012. 
However, this has not stopped Californians from eating foie gras.219 One 
restaurant is still serving foie gras because it claims that the ban does 
not apply to restaurants on federal property.220 Some restaurants are 
serving foie gras for free, and others are preparing foie gras that 
 
 211. See id. at 268–69. 
 212. See id at 270. 
 213. 7 U.S.C. §2131 (2006). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See FAVRE, supra note 164, at 310. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Fenit Nirappil, Foie Gras Ban: California Restaurants Duck New Law in Creative Ways, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/17/foie-gras-
ban_n_1680200.html?utm_hp_ref=los-angeles&ir=Los%20Angeles. 
 220. Id.  
  
2012] A Wild Goose Chase 53 
customers bring in themselves.221 These restaurants claim they can do 
this because the ban does not expressly prohibit distribution.222 There 
are also practical barriers to enforcement. For example, it is unclear who 
is charged with enforcing the ban. Thus, state agencies have little power 
to control defiant chefs and diners because of tight budgets and unclear 
statutory wording.223 
Furthermore, the day the law went into effect, a lawsuit was filed 
against the state of California by a Canadian association of foie gras 
producers, Hudson Valley Foie Gras, and a restaurant group located in 
California.224 The suit alleges that the law violates the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution.225 On July 18, 2012, the judge 
hearing the case denied a temporary restraining order, but allowed the 
case to move forward on the merits.226 The progress of this case is 
certainly worth following. 
 Overall, foie gras production is a complicated and difficult issue to 
make sense of, with passionate advocates on both sides. S.B. 1520 will 
probably not face any significant international legal challenges. It will, 
however, create discussion and encourage debate about the way we 
raise food to eat, and the role of government in regulating it.  
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